Previous studies have found that foreign direct investment is significantly related to the stock of existing investment in the area. The present paper makes an additional contribution by providing evidence that investment decisions are positively correlated to the firm's own previous investment in the area as well as to the current/planned investments by competitors. In addition, it is found that these two channels are primarily substitutes, i.e., investment by competitors comes less important when the firm already has experience in the market. The results are statistically significant and robust to various changes in model specification. 
Introduction
Does privately-acquired information play an important role in the decision to undertake foreign investment? If so, is the private information acquired through direct experience? Or is the information on a country's potential for economic returns inferred from observing actions undertaken by others who may have private information? What is the relationship between such private information and publicly available information on a country?
In this paper, we take an initial step towards answering these questions. We find that a firm's investment decisions are positively correlated to its own previous investment in the area. We interpret this as a learning effect. Investment decisions are also correlated with current/planned investments by competitors, implying the possibility that the private information held by others signals investment potential. In addition, it is found that these two channels are primarily substitutes, i.e., investment by competitors comes less important when the firm already has experience in the market. However, despite controlling for firm characteristics and country and industry effects, it is not possible to rule out alternative interpretations of the evidence. A firm expanding on its base may be benefiting from economies of scale and also from agglomeration economies. More difficult to distinguish is whether competitors' actions signal privately-held information or stimulate a strategic response. However, the evidence that the two effects act as substitutes suggests that private information plays an important role. If strategic advantage was the key driver, then we would expect that firms with past presence in a country would be equally, if not more, motivated than those without past presence to preempt competitors.
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The setting for the empirical examination is investment by Japanese manufacturing firms in a number of key Asian countries in the early 1990s and the data is from a specially designed survey of Japanese investors. To deal with scaled responses by firms, an ordered logit model is used to estimate the relationships. The stated likelihood of planned investments in a country is the dependent variable that is explained by whether the firm is already present in the country and by its perceptions of the likelihood of investments by competitors in that country.
Since the results obtained may be consistent with alternative interpretations, we attempt to control for several other information sources and investment drivers that may influence the foreign investment decisions. Specifically, we control for firm, country, and industry characteristics. Firm dummies (or firm characteristics) are included in the estimated equation to determine if the "private information" merely reflects firm attributes. The influence of public information on investment decisions is dealt with by introducing country dummies, which are assumed to embody information available to all. Finally, dummies for industrial sectors (and their interactions with past presence and expectation of rivals' actions) seek to isolate the influence of industry-specific factors, including agglomeration effects.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature, focussing on the sources of public and private information relevant for foreign direct investment decisions. This is followed by a description of the questions asked in the survey, the data, and the analysis methodology.
We then present our benchmark model, which allows for the possibility of substitution or complementarity between the two sources of private information and which controls for publicly available information through the use of country dummies. We summarize several extensions (detailed in an earlier version of the paper, Kinoshita and Mody 1997) to highlight the robustness of the findings. Finally, to help distinguish the informational interpretation favored in this paper from agglomeration and strategic rivalry effects, we control for industry characteristics.
The literature and hypotheses
Physical agglomeration of foreign investment is commonly observed, as for example in the south-eastern provinces of China and in northern Mexico close to the U.S. border. Studies of aggregate foreign investment flows have found the stock of existing investment in the area has a significant influence on new investment into that area. Wheeler and Mody (1992) found that U.S.
investments into a country were strongly conditioned by existing stocks of foreign investment in that country (after controlling for a variety of factors, including market size). Subsequent analysis shows that new Japanese investment is equally influenced by the stock of past investment (Mody and Srinivasan 1998) . The authors of these studies have speculated that the results may reflect the benefits of agglomeration economies, which may be especially relevant for industrial sectors that rely heavily on intermediate inputs from other suppliers or for sectors able to gain through spillovers between firms in close proximity. Kogut and Chang (1996) use firm-level data for Japanese multinationals investing in the United States and find past presence to be an important predictor of new investments. This evidence is consistent with the aggregate studies: persistence of foreign investment is observed at the firm-level.
However, the evidence has alternative explanations. It may reflect agglomeration economies: firms in specific agglomerations may seek to grow as they experience the benefits of proximate location.
Alternatively, the evidence (and also the evidence from aggregate studies) can be interpreted as the consequence of a foreign investor's learning experience in a country. As greater familiarity with 4 operating in the country is acquired, and the specific opportunities for expansion are revealed, more investment is committed.
Not only may firms rely on their own experience, but they may also be guided by the current/planned investment of their competitors. Where information on competitors' behavior is important, cascading of foreign investment may be observed. Persistence, punctuated by significant discontinuities, is commonly found for investments into specific countries. China has attracted a rush of investment not only from overseas Chinese but also from U.S., Japanese, and European investors, starting quite abruptly in the late 1980s and growing explosively into the mid-1990s. China receives about $40 billion a year of foreign investment despite cumbersome procedures and uncertainty surrounding property rights and contract enforceability; in contrast, India even after rolling back restrictions and a longer tradition of a market economy chalks up between $3 and 4 billion a year. A discontinuity is also being observed for Vietnam, where competing investors are staking out positions.
In a pioneering study, Knickerbocker (1973) examined the response by firms to the investment decisions of competitors. He showed that the more oligopolistic an industry, the greater was the likelihood that foreign investments would be concentrated into a short period of time, and hence display spikes or discontinuities in foreign investment flows. Recently, Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) have shown that Japanese investors in the United States tend to "follow-the-leader," affirming the signaling value of others' behavior. Once again, however, alternative explanations are possible.
Evidence of strategic rivalry may be inferred where firms are staking out positions to obtain early mover advantages. However, if firms are mainly "following-the-leader," then they are being driven less by strategic concerns than by interpreting the behavior of the leader as indicating the potential for profitable operations in the targeted location. Such privately-held informationor more accurately, private beliefscan have a significant impact on investment flows even when no fundamental change has occurred but when a perception of change leads to actions by a critical mass of investors, which then has a snowballing effect. Herd behavior parallels and reflects "cascades" of information flows (Scharfstein and Stein 1990 , Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992 , and Lee 1993 . The so-called "herd" behavioractions based on others' actionscan be quite rational in as much as it economizes on the gathering of scarce information. Arthur (1995) discusses several examples from economics and finance where private beliefs play an important role. Kuran (1995) explains the persistence of certain social institutions as well as their abrupt breakdown on the basis of privately-held but publicly concealed preferences.
Thus, from existing studies and observations of foreign investment flows, we are led to ask if private information, either from the firm's own learning experience or from observing other credible actors, is of substantial value in determining foreign investment. Private information may be important, especially in the context of emerging economies, where investors seek information on a variety of operational conditions which are not publicly available, including the functioning of labor markets, industrial literacy of the workforce (as distinct from educational attainments), the practical implementation of foreign investment polices, and the timely availability of inputs. The importance of such information on operating conditions in a country is notably illustrated by General Motors' decision to locate its Asian hub in Thailand: "...the fact that 11 car manufacturers already operate in Thailand was a sign that the country's infamous physical infrastructure and labor bottlenecks could be overcome" (Bardacke 1996) .
As with past studies cited above, our findings are open to alternative explanations, and more so than is usually the case since we attempt to highlight the importance of an unobservable 6 variableprivate information. For example, past presence may increase the probability of new investment in the country not only because of a learning effect but also because investment is characterized by economies of scale within the firm or agglomeration economies. Disentangling strategic considerations a purely information-based interpretation of the data is also difficult. The General Motors' investment in Thailand and other anecdotal evidence suggest that the strategic element of investment decisions is important. 1 Recognizing the possibility of alternative interpretations, we find, however, that the informational interpretation of investment flows has considerable basis. An important finding is that the two sources of private information are substitutes (the coefficient on the interaction variable is negative). If economies of scale and strategic rivalry were key, we would expect to find a positive and significant sign. Also, when the dummy variable representing past presence of a firm in a country is interacted with industry dummies, the interactions are all insignificantly different from zero. If economies of scale or agglomeration economies were a dominant factor, we would expect past presence to play a more significant role in industrial sectors with greater economies of scale. Similarly, interactions of industry dummy variables and perceived interest of rivals in specific locations are, with one exception, also not statistically significant.
Data and methodology
The survey questionnaire was mailed by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to several hundred Japanese firms of which 173 returned usable responses in March 1993. The sample thus obtained cannot be treated as representative of all Japanese firmswe do not know the characteristics of firms who did not respond. There is, however, sufficient heterogeneity 7 amongst the respondents to permit a statistical analysis of their foreign investment behavior. The firms in our sample are relatively large. The average annual sales are 330 billion yen (over $3 billion), the largest firm in the sample has sales of $70 billion and the smallest has sales of $2 million. This is also a set of firms that is prone to making significant foreign investmentsin the three years prior to the survey, over a fifth of their investment was undertaken outside Japan.
Our dependent variable is based on the following question regarding the firm's expectation that it will invest in specific Asian countries: "In each of the following countries, how likely are you to invest in the next three years?" Respondents were asked to check a space on a 1-7 scale provided, ranging from "very unlikely" to "very likely". Our two key independent variables are PAST and RIVAL. The questionnaire asked whether the firm already had a presence in each of the seven countries being studied. For each firm and each country, the PAST variable was coded 1 if the firm was present in the country and 0 if it was not.
Recall that we infer a learning effect if past presence leads to a high likelihood of future investment.
The other key variable allowed inference on the information obtained from competitors. The question asked was: "Are your competitors making investments in the following Asian countries?" Once again, the response allowed ranged on scale of 1 (very little) to 7 (very substantial).
The average value of the responses for the seven countries (and the standard deviations) are 
The joint probability or likelihood function is:
where d ik (k = 0,1,2) is an indicator function equal to 1 if y i = k and zero otherwise. "n" is the number of observations, where the observational unit is a firm's investment plans for each country, implying up to seven observations per firm. The parameters, β and µ, are estimated by maximizing the log of the likelihood function.
The value of private and public information: the benchmark model In the benchmark model, we regress the firm's likelihood of investing in a particular country against its past presence or absence in that country (PAST), perceptions about competitors' interest in that country (RIVAL), the interaction between PAST and RIVAL, firm and country dummies (table 2, column 4).
It is clear that the both the firm's past presence and its perception of competitors' behavior have a strong influence on its plans to invest in a country. The inclusion of the PAST*RIVAL variable improves the log-likelihood and from the likelihood ratio test we can conclude (at the 2.5 percent significance level) that the interaction term belongs to the model. The negative sign on the interaction term (PAST*RIVAL) indicates that the two channels of private information are primarily substitutes for each other.
Inclusion of firm dummies is possible because we have multiple observations for each firm (with a maximum of seven observations where a likelihood was reported for each country). If firm j's unobserved characteristics (h j ), which are part of the composite error term (e ij =h j + g ij ), are correlated with PAST and RIVAL, then the coefficients will be biased. By adding firm dummies to the regression, the unobserved characteristics become part of the set of regressors and the error term now has only the white noise component, g ij . 2 The results show that adding the firm dummies improves the statistical fit in standard ways (table 2, column 3).
The country dummies capture in summary form the relative attractiveness of the different countries and, since the coefficients on the dummy variables represent the average perception of the country, we take these to represent the publicly available information. An alternative specification would include specific country features, such as infrastructure, market size, and labor costs. As Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) have argued, a full elaboration of country characteristics is difficult, and hence a country dummy, which captures the country's attractiveness to the "average" investor, is preferred in this situation. In the next section, we do examine the effects of specific country features.
The regressions leaves out Vietnam, which is consequently the reference against which the attractiveness of other countries is measured.
The robustness of the PAST and RIVAL effects is evident. These effects are complemented by publicly available information: widely-held perceptions of a country's potential, as reflected in the dummy variable representing the country, are influential in driving investment flows. The significantly improved log-likelihood indicates that important information is contained in these country dummies.
With Vietnam as the reference, on average, investors express a strong preference for China. The Finally, instead of country dummies, we explored how perception of specific country characteristics influenced by market size, labor costs, and foreign direct investment (FDI) policy.
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Perceptions of large market potential and low labor costs tend to increase the attractiveness of countries. FDI policy was explained to respondents to include such elements as the ability to repatriate earnings, restrictions on foreign ownership, and the requirements to export and source inputs locally.
Perceptions of FDI policy are strongly influential in conditioning future plans to invest in a country.
The coefficient on FDI policy is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. However, since the coefficients on PAST and RIVAL also remain positive and significant at the 1 percent level, the evidence seems to suggest that FDI policy is additional information to that obtained by from past investment experience and actions of competitors. Perceptions of FDI policy interact in interesting with ways with PAST and RIVAL. The coefficient on the interaction term, FDIplcy*past, is negative.
Hence when PAST is equal to 1i.e., when the firm has a past presence in that countrythe effect of FDI policy is more than wiped out. In other words, perceptions of FDI policy matter little when the firm has first-hand operational experience in the country. The corollary is that perceptions of good FDI policy are especially important in attracting new investors.
Industry effects
The variables PAST and RIVAL may be picking up agglomeration and strategic rivalry rather than informational effects. By controlling for the industrial sector of the firms in our sample, we can examine if sectoral differences are important. By simultaneously controlling for country and industry effects, we can further examine if the sample firms within an industrial sector within a particular country act differently from firms in other sectors investing in that country. 5 We also interact PAST and RIVAL with industry dummies to examine if these effects are especially pronounced for particular sectors. Specifically, if the influences of the PAST or RIVAL were associated with certain sectors, then, respectively, the agglomeration and strategic rivalry effects would be important. Note, however, to test for agglomeration economies, we would need to know the extent of investment by other firms in the same industrial sector in the same location (rather than within our sample). Since we do not have that information, we cannot definitively distinguish between agglomeration and own learning effects.
The first column in table 4 shows the basic model with only the industry dummies, which are reported, and the second column includes also the country dummies, which are not reported. 6 In either case, the PAST, RIVAL, and the PAST*RIVAL variables remain highly significant, as before. The industry that was used as the base was garments and footwear (and other manufacturing firms that could not be elsewhere classified). Relative to this base, industrial sectors that expect similar levels of foreign investment are: building materials, chemicals, and food. Sectors for which the industry coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero (and which, therefore, have a lower propensity for foreign investment than the base) include electrical equipment, non-electrical equipment, and automobiles and auto parts. The significant differences in industry dummy coefficients could imply 16 either the existence of agglomeration economies in specific host locations or rising costs of production in Japan for those sectors. However, while agglomeration economies possibly exist, PAST is not a proxy for agglomeration since the effect of past presence remains an additional and important investment driver. Table 4 also reports the interactions between PAST and industry dummies (column 3) and between RIVAL and industry dummies (column 4). 7 Once again, the variables of interest to us, PAST, RIVAL, PAST*RIVAL remain highly significant, and, moreover, the interactions, with one exception, are not significant. These results, therefore, imply that PAST investment is not associated with any specific industry characteristic. Agglomeration effects, on the other hand, are likely to be more pronounced for some industrial sectors than others. Thus, we infer that past presence is important in and of itself and is, therefore, a plausible proxy for learning about operating conditions in the economy.
Similarly, the value of observing competitors is also independent of the sector, with automobiles and auto parts being the exception. Note that Japanese auto firms have a low propensity to invest relative to other sectors; however, those who do invest appear driven by strategic concerns.
Conclusions and discussion
Using a firm-level data set, we explored the empirical importance of privately-held information in foreign investment location decisions. Though the limitations of a one-time survey did not permit us follow an information "cascade" over successive generations, the value of private information, which is central to the cascade phenomenon was consistently and impressively evident.
The data permitted us, moreover, to distinguish between two types of private information: one that was obtained through direct experience in the host country and the other that was inferred from observing competitors. Direct experience is seen to provide the more credible information, as may be expected. However, in the early phases of investing in a new country when few firms have experience in the country, the actions of competitors are likely to be dominating effect, leading to an apparent herd behavior. Such is apparently the case currently for China and Vietnam, which are attracting large numbers of new investors. In contrast, countries, such as India and the Philippines, that do not draw the attention of a critical mass of investors are in danger of being bypassed for significant periods of time.
We enquired how the privately-held information could was related to publicly available information and found it to be complementary. Thus, while firms form "average" perceptions about a country leading them all to view particular locations favorably, considerable variation in investment plans exists around these averagesan important element of such variation is explained by privatelyheld information. We explored also whether private information was a proxy for subjective beliefs on certain country characteristics (e.g., FDI policy). Again, the finding was that while such subjective perceptions are important, they represent additional information to that obtained through either past experience or through observing others.
For policymakers, these findings represent a challenge. A generally favorable view of the country based on its fundamentals as well as perceptions of good policy and low labor costs lead to increased foreign investment. However, creating the right conditions for investors to directly experience the rigors of operating in a country is empirically important, as is the opportunity to observe competitors. This raises the controversial issue of special zones for foreign investors. While successful in many instances, especially in East Asia, they have also been a waste of scarce investment resources where not appropriately planned. An emerging approach is for the government to take the lead in 18 creating the policy conditions for the creation of such zones but allow private investors to undertake the necessary investments and thus ensure greater efficiency. Mexico offers an example. Under the maquiladora program, the policy environment has been created to attract foreign investors. Several private initiatives have resulted in so-called "shelters" that provide early hand-holding services to new foreign investors. (1) Parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
(2) µ is the second intercept defining the threshold for the transition from LFDI equal to 1 to 2.
(3) For industry dummies, light manufacture was used as base. (4) For country dummies, Vietnam was used as the base.
